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PREFACE 
The work reported here exemplifies one of the major general 
research directions of the former Resources and Environment (REN) Area 
and also of the present Impacts of Human Activities on Environmental 
Systems (IMP) Project concerned with the analysis of conditions for 
stable "coexistence" of interacting socio-economic and environmental 
systems. Making this coexistence sustainable requires regulating the 
whole system by means of economic, social, and other mechanisms or 
policies, and the objective is to structure the analysis of those policies 
effectively using systems analytical methodologies and computerized sys- 
tems of models. In this work, these general research issues were con- 
sidered using a more specific example of salinity management in the 
Colorado River Basin, and a more specific research goal was to analyze 
regulatory policies capable of motivating water users in the basin towards 
using low quality water for electric energy production. The methodologi- 
cal framework of this study suggests a two-stage decompositional analyti- 
cal procedure: a) generating rational scenarios of the desired "coex- 
istence" and b) analysis of regulatory policies capable of making those 
scenarios realizable, taking into account behavioral aspects of the 
policy-makers involved. Th~s paper outlines this framework, introduces a 
reader to the specifics of the Colorado salinity problem and describes the 
mathematical models developed for the scenario generation stage of the 
analysis, together with some computational results. 
This work was funded in part by an ICSAR (International Cooperation 
for Systems Analysis Research) grant. 
Janusz Kindler 
Leader 
Impacts of Human Activities 
on Environmental Systems 
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1. INTRODUrnON 
The Resources and Environment Area at IlASA has devoted considerable 
effort over several years to problems of regional management of water 
resources. This effort has covered a wide range of topics with particular 
emphasis on interaction of supply and demand functions. Since a separate 
group at  IIASA worked specifically on water quality problems, the emphasis here 
has been on water quanti ty  problems; however, quantity and quality obviously 
cannot be isolated. The demand function of a particular water user represents 
demand for water with an array of minimum requirements concerning particular 
water quality parameters. 
One possible framework for regional water management is to formalize the 
quality management aspects explicitly as follows: 
1. Emphasize regional management of water resources by allocation of 
water in a manner which matches water quality with user require- 
ments. The impbed objective here is to increase the useable water 
resource base by d-iscouraging use of high quality water by sectors 
which could use /reuse lower quality water. 
2. Accomplish objective i in a manner which considers regional economic 
efficiency. Note that objectives 1 and 2 may well be non- 
commensurate, and therefore exclusion of the regional economic 
efficiency objective will doom any problem analysis to the already 
over-crowded realm of useless academic exercises. 
3. Since regional economic efficiency is by no means synonymous with 
economic efficiency from the perspective of in&vidual water using sec- 
tors, analyze policies for motivating acceptance of water allocation in 
accordance with objectives 1 and 2. 
The emphasis of t h s  initial IIASA salinity management study has been on 
the notion of encouraging zero discharge uses of low quality water, particularly 
water h g h  in inorganic contaminants. The time and fiscal limitations of the 
study also constrained the scope of the  research to  approaches suitable for 
regions within semi-arid climates; however, a much more general discussion of 
management approaches and climatic regions is also included. 
1.1. Salinity Y anagement-Generic Difficulties 
Along with agricultural and industrial development, water resource 
p l a ~ e r s  in many regions of the world are  increasingly facing difficult manage- 
ment problems related to limiting to tolerable levels the dissolved conservative 
minerals (salts) in water resource systems. In this connection, one usually 
t h n k s  of semi-arid regions where scarce water supplies result in most surface 
water being diverted from streams and used for a variety of purposes, all of 
whch either add salts directly or a t  least concentrate salts by evaporation. In 
t h s  setting, the inevitable result is downstream flows with undesirable levels of 
various salts (plus other contaminants). Both natural in-stream and mechanical 
treatment processes can successfully reduce most of such pollutants to allow- 
able levels, The economics of desalination, however, continue to render salinity 
management by this direct means infeasible except for very hlghly valued uses. 
Since all desalination processes are very energy-intensive, recent increases in 
energy costs have destroyed cost reductions due to technological advances. 
A few examples of semi-arid regions where s a h i t y  management has already 
become a high priority problem are: (1) the Colorado River in the Western USA, 
where the present value of total future damages from salinity are estimated a t  
$2 billion; (2) the region around both the Aral and Caspian Seas in the Southern 
USSR, where the Aral Sea may soon be reduced to a salt marsh; and (3) the Mur- 
ray River Basin in South Australia, which has a severe salinity problem in lower 
reaches due mostly to saline irrigation return flows in upper parts of the basin. 
The problem of salinity management, however, is by no means limited to  
semi-arid regions. When salinity problems occur in humid regions, they are in 
some ways more difficult to manage than in more arid regions. A common 
approach in dry climates, for example, is to divert saline water into a zero- 
discharge evaporation pond to avoid its contaminating a river. In a hurnid cli- 
mate, where annual rainfall exceeds evaporation, this is clearly not possible. 
Examples of major salinity problems in humid climates include: (1) the Vistula 
River Basin in Poland where highly saline water is drained from many coal mines; 
and (2) the Ohio River in the Eastern US, where effluent from industrial users of 
natural brines motivated the first major regional water quality management 
organization in the US. 
There is a large body of literature on both the economic theory of, and 
actual experiences in, many countries attempting to manage water quality. 
Wble most management approaches to date have been limited to mandatory 
regulation of effluent limits, both economic theory and some experience with 
innovative techniques imply that  for most situations, a better approach is some 
kind of e c o n o m i c  i n c e n t i v e  which makes it profitable for the water user either to  
minimize his effluent (perhaps to zero), or to maximize the quality of effluent. 
This seems to work well for most industrial effluents where the liquid waste 
problem is a relatively minor fraction of the total cost of the product. Most 
salinity problems, however, are caused by either return flows from agriculture 
or mineral exploration and/or production. In the case of non-point effluents 
from agriculture, water treatment is simply not feasible. Whether in the form of 
penalties to  the irrigator or subsidy for the cost of treatment, one very quickly 
finds that the problem solution cost is very large relative to the value of water in 
the production of most agricultural goods. The quantity of salt in return flows 
can be decreased marginally by improving irrigation efficiently via lining canals 
and through sprinkling rather than floor irrigation. However, the fact is that as 
long as irrigation continues, it will remain the major source of salinity in semi- 
arid regions. 
The question then remains whether, in addition to  any feasible on-farm 
actions to minimize salt in irrigation return flows, other management actions 
are possible. Since the value of water for irrigation is too low to solve the prob- 
lem withn the sub-system of an agricultural enterprise, is it possible to. solve it 
withln another sector such as industrial water use, where the value of water is 
very high relative to  clean-up costs? Such a concept raises obvious "who pays" 
and "who benefits" types of equity questions as well as the more basic question: 
is there a net benefit to society from such an  arrangement? If there is no such 
net beneflt, a policy based entirely upon economic efficiency might be simply to 
require the irrigator to stop polluting. Since the only way agriculture may be 
able to do t h s  is to  stop production, the solution will take that form. This, of 
course, ignores other economic, social and political objectives such as rural 
development, unemployment, long-term agricultural stability, etc. 
The approach used in addressing such questions during this study was to 
develop the necessary models to quantify the incremental costs (and benefits) of 
salinity management both from a regional and an individual water user perspec- 
tive. 
A complicating aspect of the salinity management problem is that  it is not 
clear if a particular salinity management project should be pursued even when 
estimated costs exceed benefits. For example, policy introduced by an environ- 
mental regulating agency may result in allowable upper limits on salinity within 
a river basin without explicit benefit/cost justifikation. The implied rationale 
may range from public health factors to rural development policy. What is clear 
is that regardless of benefit/cost ratio cutoff criteria, it is important to be able 
to: (1) rank management projects according to relative economic efficiency; (2) 
understand the impact of such projects upon other water users in terms of 
costs, incremental salinity changes, and water volume availability; and (3) 
analyze the effectiveness of appropriate policies as the tools of the regional 
salinity management. These are the issues addressed by this study. 
As previously suggested, man-made salinity problems are not caused solely 
by irrlgation return flows in semi-arid regions. Mineral exploration processes 
such as oil test holes which penetrate saline artesian aquifers, and coal mines 
whch produce highly saline and/or acid effluents are common sources. In the 
case of oil bore holes, it is often impossible to prevent saline flows once the 
aqui-clude is penetrated. In the case of coal mining, salinity management can 
be so expensive, particularly in humid climates where zero-discharge evapora- 
tion is not possible, that  the cost is hlgh relative to the value of coal, thereby 
causing the same kind of management difficulty as in the case of irrigation. 
A principal topic of interest in t h s  study is the motivation of industrial 
users to consume low quality water. Rather than addressing the question of 
penalizing a "bad", we will consider policies for motivating a "good", that is, 
motivating the users to  implement technologies which help to improve salinity of 
the regional water resources system. 
As will be seen from t h s  report, we use a two-stage decomposition analyti- 
cal approach. According to  t h s  approach, the first stage is the analysis of the 
salinity problem from the regional perspective, focusing on studying regional 
scenarios of the use of water resources; the second stage involves the analysis of 
motivation policies providing for the realization of regionally good scenarios. 
Although this report outlines the general approach and describes a relevant 
game-theoretic formulation of a salinity management problem, it is malnly con- 
cerned with the implementation of the first stage of this study--analysis of 
scenarios for regional salinity management. 
The material in t h s  report is organized as follows. In the subsequent sec- 
tion we discuss a broad scope of salinity management technological alternatives 
and classify them according to their applicability in different climates, their 
impacts on water quality, and their economic efficiency. Sections 3 and 4 are 
methodological. They outline a systems analytical framework that we follow in 
this study, and also a game-theoretic conceptualization of a regulatory policy. 
Section 5 serves as an  introduction to salinity problems in the  Colorado River 
Basin, that  was used as a case region for the study. Section 6 describes the 
structure of the scenario generating module that was applied for the first stage 
analysis of the salinity management in that region. Preliminary results obtained 
using t h s  module and their brief discussion are presented in Sect. 7. Further 
planned research for this study will be focused on the elaboration of a policy 
design module and we indicate a proposed initial approach to  t h s  in the Appen- 
dix to  this report. 
2. SALINrrY MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES 
Any project or policy whch reduces diversion of relatively h g h  quality 
water from a receiving stream, or whlch prevents more water of poorer quality 
from reachng the river, will result in a lower downstream salinity concentration. 
A wide range of activities can produce such a result. Examples of salinity 
management alternatives which have been discussed in the literature and/or 
are analyzed during t h s  study are displayed in Table 1. The Table divides these 
alternatives into seven categories, indicates climates where each may be techni- 
cally feasible, the nature of the impact on water quality and a very general indi- 
cation of the economic efficiency. The economic indicator is necessarily very 
vague and not very useful at  this level because the essence of any salinity prob- 
lem is site-specific. Following is a brief description of salinity management 
alternatives whch are indicated in Table 1. 
Beneficial Use of LQW 
Thm category includes most of the alternatives analyzed in more detail dur- 
ing t h s  study and which therefore will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
They are all technically (though not necessarily economically) feasible in warm 
semi-arid c h a t e s  where evaporation is substantially greater than precipitation 
even during infrequent wet years. Two of the alternatives ( 2  and 3) also may be 
useful in wetter and cold climates, since they do not require final disposal by 
evaporation and on-site storage of salt. 
The zero-discharge evaporation pond concept is based on the premise that: 
(1) a pond llning is provided to prevent ground water contamination, and (2) 
adequate pond depth is provided for storage of salt precipitation for many 
years, after whch the working pond will be replaced and the salt sealed under 
an ~mpervious cover of non-erodible material. Such ponds are already being 
used extensively at electric generating plants in the Western US, where environ- 
mental regulations virtually prohbit return flows. 
Strategies for Humid Climate 
The second category includes alternatives especially suitable for humid cli- 
mates but which are useable in other climates. The effectiveness of alternative 
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runoff periods - is directly proportional to the extent of hlgh runoff volume (fre- 
quency times duration times flow rate). This approach is currently being used in 
Poland's Vistula River Basin to  reduce salinity damages from very low quality 
flows from coal mines. In situations where the ratio of saline flow to local river 
flow volume is too high, alternative 7 may be explored. The economic feasibility 
of transporting the LQW to the sea or to a larger river is of course dependent 
upon the distances, types of terrain, and pumping costs involved. Pumping 
costs can be minimized by generating energy during descent, but pumps and 
turbines with impellers of special materials (corrosion/deposition resistant) will 
probably be required. 
Change in T w e  of Use 
Alternatives 8, 9 and 10 involve changes of water use in a manner which 
reduces salinity. Purchases of irrigation water by energy producers have been 
shown to  produce salinity reduction benefits (Bagley, Willardsen, and Hughes, 
forthcoming) even when done without a salinity management objective. The rea- 
son for this is that energy producers are normally subjected to  tough environ- 
mental controls (such as zero water discharge), while such control on irrigation 
return Aows are simply neither economically feasible nor enforceable. 
Alternative 9 involves a reduction of irrigation on land where return flows 
are particularly salty, and simply leaving t h s  water inrthe .river or tributary. 
The approach has the advantage of the previous energy transfer (avoiding salt 
loading of agricultural return flows) plus the additional advantage of increasing 
h g h  quality dilution flow to the river. The obvious disadvantage is economic 
since the agricultural production foregone is not balanced by an increase in 
revenue-producing activity. However, when downstream reduction in s a h i t y -  
related damages are important, thls approach has been shown to be feasible 
(Narayanan e t  al., 1979). 
Alternative 10 envisions the creation of a water right marketing authority-- 
an agency empowered to act  as a broker in the purchase of existing water rights 
from users which produce salinity problems (such as irrigators of highly saline 
soils) and to resell such water to users who would agree to manage their effluent 
in a salinity reduction mode. The water banking concept is currently being pro- 
posed for various reasons such as water conservation (Bagley et al. ,  1980), but 
also including salinity management (Howe and Orr, in Flack and Howe, 1974). 
I m p r o v e m e n t s  in I r r i g a t i o n  Technology  
Various improvements in irrigation practice such as lining canals and 
conversion to sprinkler irrigation are being proposed and in some cases are 
already occurrug due to salinity management policies (often federal subsidies). 
See, for example, USBR (1981a). The lining of canals is intended to reduce deep 
percolation through saline soils, whle sprinkler irrigation is intended to reduce 
irrigation return flows relative to flood irrigation. 
Increase  of Useable  Water  Supply 
One basic way to reduce salinity is to somehow increase the amount of high 
quality water (HQW) in a river. The most obvious method for doing t h s  is to 
import HQW into the problem basin (alternative 13). Ths  has the advantage of 
increasing the useable resource base (in the receiving region) as well as reduc- 
ing salinity. That approach has been proposed for several regions of Southern 
USSR, including rivers terminating in both the Caspian and Aral Seas (Voropaev, 
1978). 
Other approaches to increasing HWQ include weather modification, evapora- 
tion suppression and phreatophyte control. An interesting property of the two 
latter methods is that they in effect "create" water of perfect quality by reduc- 
ing evaporation or transpiration. Both weather modification research and some 
operation programs designed to increase either snowpack or rainfall are well 
established ongoing programs in several regions of the world. The objective is 
normally to increase runoff, but the related salinity reduction benefit due to 
dilution is apparent. 
Evaporation suppression efforts have largely been devoted to using either 
mono-layer Alms on large reservoirs or various membranes on small ponds (Coo- 
ley, 1974). The results of extensive research on mono-layer techniques in the US 
have been disappointing (Blackmer e t  al., 1970). Although more optimistic 
results were reported in Australia durlng the 1950's and 60's (Mansfield, 1962; 
Fitzgerald and Vines, 1963), no operational programs now exist. A more promis- 
ing approach for some reservoirs appears to be thermal mixing to cool the 
reservoir surface (Hughes, Richardson and Franckiewicz, 1975), which should be 
able to  produce evaporation reductions of 20 to 25 percent on deep reservoirs. 
Phreatophyte control consists of reducing the amount of deep-rooted vege- 
tation which consumes large quantities of groundwater, particularly along river 
flood plains in semi-arid regions. There are usually significant negative environ- 
mental impacts associated with eliminating such vegetation and therefore the 
outlook for reducing salinity by this method is marginal at best. 
The potential for salinity reduction by any of the dilution-type approaches 
(including importation) is somewhat less than the associated increase in water 
volume. Simple calculations show, for example, that if an importation project 
adds water that is one-third of the previous concentration at  some downstream 
point of interest (and if none of the new water is diverted above that point), the 
river flower flow would have to be increased by 100 percent in order to reduce 
river salinity by one-thrd or increased by 50 percent in order to achieve a 22 
percent river salinity reduction. 
Desalination 
Direct methods of removlng salt from water are usually feasible only for 
hlgh valued uses such as municipal and industrial process water. There is a 
large body of literature on various desalination methods which will not be cited 
here. One unusual desalination project which is of interest since its product 
water will be used for irrigation is the proposed 49 MW, $190 million desalting 
plant near Yuma, Arizona (Van Schilfgarde, in Skogerboe, 1982). m s  solution to 
a problem of salt damage to agricultural soil was motivated by political con- 
siderations related to an international (US-Mexico) treaty, and could never be 
justified on a purely economic basis. 
MisceUaneous 
In situations where industrial activities produce effluents with substantial 
amounts of salt, the time-honored approach of effluent standards and/or the 
approach preferred by economists-effluent charges or marketable permits-are 
likely to be appropriate. One of the initial and largest regional water quality 
management efforts in the US was the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Com- 
pact (ORSANCO). One of the principal river contamination problems in this basin 
was related to mining of natural saturated salt brines and saline flows from coal 
mines. A regulatory effort for salinity management (chlorides) was imple- 
mented in which the principal alternative used was one discussed previously- 
temporary storage for dscharge during h.gh flow periods. 
A large body of literature (produced principally by Resources for the 
Future) has been addressed to the economics of environmental policy, particu- 
larly to the concept of effluent charges. That literature was reviewed, but will 
not be discussed here, since the focus of much of this report will be the opposite 
of the effluent charge setting. As indicated in the introduction, a principal topic 
of interest here will be the motivation of industrial water users to consume LQW. 
Rather than addressing the question of penalizing a "bad", we will consider polt- 
cies for motivating a "good." 
A recent publication (Milliken and Lohman, 1981) on precisely that topic, 
which used the same river basin (Colorado) as t h s  research for a case study, will 
be of considerable value in relation to the policy design portion of this research. 
Two final methods of LQW disposal are long-term retention of salt, either 
below ground (injection into deep formations that are hydrologically isolated 
from better quality groundwater) or above ground by construction of zero 
discharge evaporation ponds. 
An example of the former has been proposed by the US Bureau of Reclama- 
tion for disposal of an extremely saline water source in Paradox Valley, 
Colorado. The plan is to inject the brine into a permeable formation a t  a depth 
of 14,000 feet (USBR, 1982). The economics of such projects are highly site 
specific and require low energy demand for injection pumping and a suitablg 
geologic formation 
The use of zero discharge evaporation ponds has already been discussed in 
connection with industrial cooling waste stream disposal; however, the evapora- 
tion pond is also a common solution for disposal of naturally occurring (or man- 
made) surface flows of LQW. The cost of this approach is highly dependent upon 
large areas of very low-cost land with relatively flat topography whlch allows 
inexpensive low perimeter dikes. A small but constant flow of water requires a 
surprisingly large evaporation surface. For example, a flow of only 1 liter per 
second at  a site with 1 meter of net annual evaporation (total evaporation minus 
precipitation) requires a pond area of 32,000 m2 (8 acres). 
3. ! W S l X M  S ANALYTICAL BASIS OF THE SWDY 
Problems of salinity management fall into a more general category of 
regional environmental management problems. Their principal feature is that 
apart from analyzing relevant environmental systems and process, an explicit 
consideration is required of economic, social and other incentives, regulation 
mechanisms, etc. which play a decisive role in the evolution of environmental 
systems. Here we briefly outline both the basic general features of this type of 
problem, and also a systems analytic conceptual and methodological basis that 
provides a framework for structuring the analysis of these problems and for 
developing appropriate analytical procedures and systems of mathematical 
models. 
Env i ronmenta l  a n d  so cw-economic  subsystems 
We consider a regional system under study as consisting of two major parts: 
the environmental subsystem (ES) and the socio-economic (SE) subsystem (Fig- 
ure 1). 
Socio-economic subsystem 
A A A A A 
t w w w w 
Environmental subsystem 
Figure 1 .  Major subsystems of a  r eg iona l  system. 
Both subsystems are in interaction with each other; the analysis of this interac- 
tion, aiming a t  the determination of the means and the limits of regulating it to 
some extent, is the general goal of the study. 
Env i ronmenta l  subsystem 
Generally, the models of the environmental subsystem include the descrip- 
tion of all natural aspects and processes like water resources, soil, air, and oth- 
ers. But in a more specific study such as the one considered in t h s  paper, i t  
suflices to include in the models of the ES the description of only those parts 
and processes that pertain to the goals of the analysis. As an example, for the 
sahnity management study it suffices to include in the ES only a description of 
the natural surface (and possibly ground) water resources in terms of quantity 
and salt concentration. 
Socio-economic s u b s y s t e m  
Typically, the SE subsystem is of a complex he ra r chca l  structure and con- 
sists of interdependent elements (producers-users of the environmental 
resources, various legislative agencies, governmental commissions, etc.),  each 
possessing its own goals and possibilities for action to influence the evolution of 
the whole system. 
The lower level elements (users of the resources) of t h s  subsystem are 
those directly interacting with the environment (by exploiting natural 
resources, discharging waste products, etc.), but these interactions are of a 
local character since each of these elements considers at  the most his own local 
environment and even then only in cases when there is a direct feedback from 
that local environment to his goals. These interactions depend upon the produc- 
tion technologies (or the resources use technologies) implemented by the users, 
which are chosen according to their goals. In the context of salinity manage- 
ment various types of such technologies for various producers are outlined in 
Section 2 of this paper. The point is that in most real systems these local 
interactions are focused on local goals, are not coordmated with each other, and 
do not satisfy regional objectives. 
On the other hand, the upper level elements of the SE subsystem (govern- 
mental agencies, etc.),  whch have goals more closely reflecting the regional 
perspectives, do not directly control the interactions of the SE subsystem with 
the environment, but have some (more or less limited, depending on the partic- 
ular system) possibilities for influencing (regulating or motivating) the behavior 
of the lower level elements of the system. (A  concept of a regulatory policy used 
in this study is discussed in Section 4 of the report). The problem is to deter- 
mine those policies whch  can induce (or motivate) those interactions of the 
lower elements with the ES (and therefore the interactions of the SE subsystem 
with the ES) that are rational from the regional perspective. 
The feasibility and applicability of various regulatory policies depend on the 
institutional and social structure of the particular SE subsystem considered and 
therefore an understanding of this structure and of the goals and possibilities of 
its interacting elements is required. 
Model StT1Lcture of the SE System 
No mathematical formulation can encompass all the aspects of a real 
regional SE subsystem, and the goal of a mathematically based analysis is not to 
determine final solutions to a real problem under study, but rather to elaborate 
supplementary tools which can be used together with other analytical 
approaches to  obtain insights which can be of help to policy-makers. Any model 
structure chosen for the analysis must be fairly simple and yet include essential 
characteristic features of the real system in question. As a first approximation 
in t h s  study we use a simplified two-level structure of the SE subsystem of the 
form shown in Figure 2. The upper level element of t b s  structure (regulating 
body or, in our case, a salinity management agency) represents the regional 
perspective and has at  its disposal policies capable of motivating to some extent 
rational interactions of the lower level elements (producers-users) with the 
environmental subsystem. This structure allows for a reasonably simple and 
clear mathematical formulation within the framework of the hierarchcal game 
I 
I ~ocioixonomic subsystem I 
I Environmental subsystem r 
I , I 
F i g u r e  2 .  Model s t r u c t u r e  of a r e g i o n a l  s y s t e m .  
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I 
theory. Ths  formulation helps to conceptualize and understand the nature of 
regulatory policies and processes in systems of t h s  type and also to indicate the 
lines of the analysis. An example of t h s  type of formulation for the sahnity 
Salinity 
management 
agency (SMA) 
management study is discussed in Section 4 of t h s  paper. On the basis of the 
4 I 
I I 
results obtained using this simplified structure, further research dealing with 
more comprehensive institutional models can be facilitated. 
Decomposition analytical approach 
More often than not substantial difficulties arise when the abovementioned 
game-theoretic formulation is directly used for the analysis, and simplified prac- 
tially implementable approaches are needed. In this study we use an approach 
based on the approximate decomposition of the problem. Th.~s approach makes 
it possible to analyze qualitatively various types of regulatory policies, and is 
also suitable for the implementation of interactive means of analysis. 
The first stage of the analysis using this approach is directed towards gen- 
erating scenarios of the development of the regional system under study. At 
t b s  stage the analysis aims at: the evaluation of the marginal possibilities of the 
regional development in terms of the regional indicators of effectiveness; no 
interests of the lower level elements are considered explicitly and the analysis 
results in generating in some sense an ideal scenario of salinity management 
(or, more generally, the scenario of rational ES-SE interactions). Ths  scenario 
is described in terms of the essential parameters of the socio-economic and/or 
of the environmental structure of the system. 
A t  the second stage of the analysis, the scenario just obtained serves as a 
"target" scenario; the analysis at this stage is concerned with the search for 
those region-specific feasible regulatory policies 'that can provide for the 
development of the whole system along the lines specified by the scenario. 
Since the lirst stage of the analysis is performed without explicitly consid- 
ering the feasible regulatory policies, the scenario obtained a t  the lirst stage 
may be practically unattainable, or, in other words, no one of the feasible poli- 
cies may provide for the realization of this scenario. In such cases, the analysis 
has to come back to the first stage and search for another "less ideal" scenario 
that is attainable using some of the feasible regulatory po!icies. Moreover, feasi- 
ble policies may differ from each other in their "degree of feasibility" (for exam- 
ple, two policies may differ from each other by the public reaction to  their 
implementation). Recognizing these (social, political, etc.) factors, environmen- 
tally and/or economically less effective scenarios may have to  be considered 
that may be acheved using regulatory policies whch are more attractive to the 
interest groups involved. 
These and many other aspects of the system under analysis that have not 
been explicitly included in the formulation of the mathematical models necessi- 
tate performing the analysis interactively; therefore, interactive analytical 
methodologies and procedures should be elaborated and included in the com- 
puter software supporting the analysis. 
Schematically, this decomposition analytical procedure is illustrated in Fig- 
ure 3. The basic part of the  scenario generating module is a regional model 
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Options 
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Policy design module I y I  
Figure 3. Schematic of decomposition approach. 
which includes an aggregated description of the technological, hydrologic, and 
economic aspects of the regional system in question. The technological models 
indicated in Figure 3 are used for obtaining functional relationships between 
water, energy and money inputs and outputs whch drive the regional model. 
Options of regional development ("Options of reg. dev." in Figure 3) include set- 
ting up various limits on sahnity reduction in a river system, limits on the agri- 
cultural production, values of the installed capacities of power plants, etc. By 
varying these options, various scenarios of regional salinity management are 
generated. The "policy design" module is used to verify whether the scenarios 
obtained can be attained using appropriate classes of regulatory policies. The 
game- theoretic conceptualization of a regulatory policy for regional salinity 
management is discussed in the subsequent section of t h s  report. 
4.1. Introduction 
As has been discussed one of the effective means of reducing the salinity 
level in a river consists in introducing those water use technologies that reduce 
the amount of salt entering the main stream of the river. Such technologies, 
which have been described in Sect. 11 of this paper, include, for example, 
sprinkler irrigation in agriculture, and also cooling technologies for power plants 
whch allow the use of hlghly saline water. However, the use of these technolo- 
gies requires additional capital investments whch are often not economically 
justified from the viewpoint of the water users since the advantages of these 
innovations may benefit the other (usually downstream) users. On the other 
hand, the implementation of the new technologies may be effective for the 
development of the basin as a whole. 
Obviously, a detailed analysis of the problem would require the considera- 
tion of multiple factors like the interrelations of the federal government with the 
river basin states, the roles played by various commissions regulating the activi- 
ties of private enterprises and many others. In t h s  section, however, we aim at  
illustrating the application of the general hierarchical analytical approach and 
therefore simplify the institutional structure of the region by considering only 
two basic interest levels (see Fig. 2): a salinity management agency, .(SMA), (the 
upper level), and the producers (lower level) using water resources of the upper 
part of the basin and thus affecting the salinity of downstream water. Each of 
the producers has his own goals and his possibilities whch are generally 
different from each other and also from those of the government. 
The subsequent discussion will appear to attribute powers to the SMA that  
probably no single agency will ever possess. The reason for this apparent naivety 
is that  the term SMA as  used here is not a single agency but rather a surrogate 
for all government agencies at  federal, regional or state level which either: (1) 
have an interest in salinity management or: (2) have regulatory powers whch 
can influence the effectiveness of those agencies with salinity management 
objectives. In the U.S. ,  examples of the first group entities would be in the 
Colorado River basin the seven state salinity forum, the US Bureau of Reclama- 
tion (USBR) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Examples of the 
second type are utility rate regulating commissions (both state and federal), 
and Upper Basin state governments and their water right agencies. Since these 
entities do not have the same objectives, the  single SMA concept is an  obvious 
first approximation whch  nevertheless can be a useful starting point for further 
research in t h s  direction using more comprehensive institutional models and 
analytical procedures. 
4.2. Goals and possibilities of the regional producers 
Each of the major water users in the region is characterized by h s  techno- 
logical, institutional and other characteristics, which should be considered to a 
smaller of greater extent in the formulation of relevant mathematical models. In 
this section, however, we use a somewhat general aggregated description to out- 
line more clearly the logic of our analytical approach. 
We assume that there are N water users in the region considered. Each of 
them can implement various production technologies with different require- 
ments for water resources quantity and quality. For k-th producer (user) we 
denote by the technological matrix describing his possible technologies. As 
an example, for an agricultural producer an element zij of the matrix xk may 
have the meaning of the area of land allocated for growing i - th  type of crop 
using j- th technologies of irrigation, soil treatment, use of fertilizers, etc. For an  
energy producer, zii may have the meaning of the amount of electricity pro- 
duced using water from i - th  source (of particular salinity) and j - th  cooling tech- 
nology (ordinary cooling tower, binary cooling tower, nonconvective ponds, etc.).  
Denote by wk(xk)  vector of the amounts of water withdrawn by the k-th 
producer from various sources in the region, and by s k ( x k )  the corresponding 
total amount of salt removed from the river by this producer. We should note 
here that  sk (y ) may have a negative value when the technologies 3 used by 
the producer cause the introduction of additional amounts of salt into the river. 
Clearly, the amounts of water and salt removed from the river basin by the 
producers are constrained by physical, institutional and other constraints that  
depend upon the existing structure of the water rights, various water regulation 
legislations, etc. We write the system of this type of constraints in the following 
form: 
pk ( wk , s k ) s 0 .  (1) 
An activity of the k-th producer lies in the choice of a technological matrix 
that is feasible with respect to the constraints of type (1) 
The rationality of the producer's behavior depends upon the structure of 
h s  preferences on the set  of h s  feasible technological matrices. The case when 
a producer evaluates the rationality of his behavior using multiple indicators is 
very typical to many real problems, but here for simplicity we assume that any 
producer uses only one aggregated indicator -- his net benefit -- that  includes 
the revenue obtained by selling his products on the market, capital investments, 
management costs, etc.  Then the rational behavior (choices of technological 
matrices) of a producer is that whch gives the maximal value of that indicator 
(maximal net benefit). 
An important feature of the regional system considered here is that the  
benefit of a producer depends not only upon h s  choice of a technological 
matrix, but also upon the mechanisms or policies applied by the S M A  for regu- 
lating the activities of the producers in the region. To account for t h s  we denote 
the net benefit function of the k-th producer by B~ (XI' , u k )  with uk being a vec- 
tor of parameters controlled by the S M A .  Whch parameters of the producers' 
benefit functions can be controlled by the S M A  and can therefore be included as 
components of the vector u k  depends upon the economic structure of the 
region, upon its institutional configuration, upon the existing practice of the 
relations between the government and the producers in the region, and also 
upon other region-specific factors. 
As a n  example, the following parameters may, in principle, be considered as 
possible components of the  vector uk : 
1. maximum prices per unit production by a monopoly (such as electri- 
city prices set by a utility regulating commission); 
2. sizes of the subsidies for the introduction of progressive technologies; 
3. sizes of credits (and the interest rates); 
4, taxes on the profits of the producers; 
5, maximal amounts of water withdrawn from various sources; 
6, prices per unit amounts of water from various sources; 
7 ,  value of the fair return rate on the capital. 
We should note, of course, that the parameters indicated here serve only as an 
illustration, and a thorough analysis is needed to justify the effectiveness and 
the feasibilityof the use of these parameters in each particular case. 
The interaction between the S M A  and the producers may be modeled as fol- 
lows. The S M A  either sets the values of the control parameters, or communi- 
cates to the producers its functional rules for fixing these values depending, for 
example, on the technologies implemented by the producers, on the amount of 
salt removed from the river, on the amounts of water withdrawn from the river, 
etc. These func t i ona l  r u l e s  a re  w h a t  w e  r e f e r  t o  as  regulation or motivation 
policies. Their feasible structures also depend upon institutional, political and 
other aspects of the regional system, and should be considered in advance and 
possibly modified, in the course of the analysis. 
All these feasible rules constitute the s e t  of feas ib le  r e g u l a t i o n  ( m o t i v a t i o n )  
po l ic ies  a t  the disposal of the SMA. We shall use the notation: 
Zk = uk (P), 
for a policy of the SMA's influence on the activity of the k-th producer, and uk 
for the corresponding set of all feasible policies. 
It is worthwhile noticing here that despite the feasibility of all policies from 
the set uk, the SMA may prefer one type of policies to another; for example, tak- 
mg into account public opinion and other factors that are exogenous with 
respect to the mathematical formulation considered. For t h s  reason, the 
rational choice of policies should always be made on the basis of a trade-off 
between the economic, environmental, and other effectiveness of policies, and 
their degree of "popularity". 
The SMA's influence on a producer's activity can be affected not only 
through the goal (benefit) function B ~ ,  but also through the constraints under 
wbch the producer chooses his rational behavior. For example, the SMA may 
have the authority to set upper limits on water withdrawals from various 
sources, set standards for waste products discharges into the river, etc. To 
account for the possibility of such actions, we also introduce control parameters 
into the constraints vector-function (I), and write the constraints in the form: 
q k  ( w k  ,sk ,Ek) 6 0 (2) 
Using the above notation, the activity of the k-th producer. with regard to any 
policy set up by the SMA may be described as the tendency to choose a techno- 
logical matrix xk maximizing the value of the benefit function B ~ ( ( X , C ~ )  sub- 
ject to the constraints (2). In other words, for a fixed policy gk, the rational 
behavior of the k-th producer (choice of matrix Xf) can be obtained as a solu- 
tion to the following problem: 
B ~ ( ( X ~ : , C ~ )  + max 
Xf 
p k ( w k , s k , Z k )  I 0  
with gk, p k ,  wk(Xf ) ,  S' (xk ) ,  ck being functions whcha re  either explicitly for- 
mulated or are implicitly contained in the mathematical models used for the 
analysis. 
4.3. Goals and possibilities of the !WA 
In the context of the salinity management problem considered here, we 
assume that the SM1\ evaluates the effectiveness of the regional development in 
terms of the following indicators: 
1 P - total (regional) net benefit of all the producers in the region plus the 
downstream benefits due to the improvements of the water salinity; 
2 Q - total SMA expenditures on the implementation of the motivation policies 
(including possible subsidies, lower interest rates on credits, etc.) ;  
3 C - reduction of the salinity of water a t  a specific point of interest 
If we denote the downstream benefits from the salinity reduction by 
R(x', . . . , xN) ,  then the total regional benefit function can be written in the 
form: 
Using the above indicators we can describe the objectives of the SMA as 
obtaining possible greater values of the functions P and C, and possibIe lower 
values of Q. Therefore, in the case when the preferences of the SMA are based on 
multiple indicators, the analysis of the problem requires the application of both 
game-theoretic reasoning and techniques for multiobjective decision-making. 
However, to simplify our formulation, we shall f i s t  assume that  the SMA has set 
the lowest admissible level C* of the downstream salinity reduction and thus 
considers all salinity reductions satisfying the inequality: 
C(X', . . . , x N p  C*, 
as equally satisfactory. Secondly, we shall combine all the costs Q with the net 
benefit function P  and assume that  the goal of the SMA is to obtain the greater 
possible total benefit ( P - Q )  
Under these assumptions, we obtain the goal function of the SMA in the 
form: 
and also that  the rational behavior of the S U  consists in maximizing t h s  func- 
tion by choosing feasible policies zk E uk, k = l , . . . , N  under the additional con- 
straint: 
c(xl, . . . , x N )  2 c*, (6) 
4.4. Rational behavior of the SMA (principles of choosing the motivation poli- 
cies) 
The next stage of our analysis is to  obtain a mathematical formulation for 
the problem of rational choice of motivation policies outlined in the preceding 
sections. Here we use a framework provided by the hierarchical game theory 
based on the modified max-min principle (see Germeyer, 1976) and it is our aim 
here to demonstrate its application to our problem. 
Let us assume that the SMA has set up some feasible motivation policies 
Gk E uk, k = 1, ..., N ,  and has informed the producers about them. Denote by 
Rk(*) the set  of all solutions to problem (3) describing all possible responses of 
the k-th producer to the policy u k .  In other words, the set nk ( c k )  consists of all 
technological matrices p, which provide for the maximal (or  satisfactory) 
benefit of the k-th producer subject to the corresponding constraints for the 
given policy of the SMA. 
Since this analysis is performed prior to the actual implementation of poli- 
cies and that ,  therefore, the SMA is not in a position to know the particular 
response of the k-th producer to the policy zk, it should naturally consider all 
matrices from the set  p ( z k )  as equally probable reactions of this producer. 
Then the adequate evaluation of any feasible policies zk,  k = 1, ..., N from the 
point of view of the SMA is the following value (guaranteed value): 
On the basis of t h s  evaluation, the SMA considers as rational those policies 
whlch give the maximal guaranteed value or, in other words, which maximize the 
w 
function ~ ( c ' ,  . . . . z N ) .  Therefore, the problem of the rational choice of 
motivation policies can be formulated as the problem of determining policies 
z;I,', . . . , GN, which give the followmg value of the goal function of the SMA: 
d w l  @N P(u, , . . . , u, ) = max min_ P(x'. . . . . ~";y"'.. . . .CN),  iYk€uk P € n k ( u k )  (7) 
k = 1 ,  .... N k = 1 ,  ..., N 
and also provides for the satisfaction of the salinity constraint (6). 
It  is important to note here that according to this formulation the rational 
choice of policies is based on the information possessed by the SMA with regard 
to the behavior of the producers. In Eq. ( 7 ) ,  this information has the form of the 
sets R k ( z k )  of possible responses of the producers to various motivation poli- 
cies. These sets can be obtained by the SMA (or rather by the analysts perform- 
ing the analysis for the SMA) either explicitly, for example, by consulting 
experts, or using a model of the producers' behavlor of the type (3). In both 
cases, the "wider" these sets are,  the greater the uncertainty is with regard to 
the behavior of the producers, and the "lower" the guaranteed total SMA's 
N N  
"benefit" or the guaranteed effectiveness of the policies Et, . . . , % is. 
The practical implementation of t h s  type of formulation of the problem 
requires simultaneous consideration of problem (7) and also of all problems of 
the type (3).  The associated mathematical and computational difficulties depend 
greatly upon the form of ' the functions involved. Some examples of obtaining 
solutions to economic problems of this type can be found in Vatel and Ereshko, 
1977. 
In t h s  study we use a simplified approach based on the decomposition of 
the analysis into two major stages. Ths  approach, that  has been outlined in the 
previous section and illustrated by the diagram in Flgure 3, is applied to the 
problem of salinity management in the Colorado river basin chosen as the case 
region for t h s  study. 
In the subsequent Section 5 we introduce some issues specific to this 
region. Then, in Sect. 6 we describe the models implemented for the scenario 
generating module that ,  according to our approach, is used to  perform the first 
stage of the analysis. T h s  module includes facilities for its interactive use and 
some preliminary results obtained for the Colorado basin are discussed in Sect. 
7 of this report. These and other results obtained using the scenario generat- 
ing module are intended for their use at  the next stage of the study concerned 
with the analysis of the roles of various classes of motivation policies in the 
regional salinity management. We briefly outline an approach to t h s  second 
stage analysis that  we plan to implement in the future in the Appendix to this 
report. 
5. THE COLORADO rCrVER SALTNITY PROBLEM 
5.1. Background 
During the past 50 years, the Colorado River has evolved from a water- 
course characterized by alternating periods of raging floods and extreme low 
flows to one of the world's most regulated major rivers. An indication of the 
degree of regulation is the fact that the major reservoirs have a combined 
storage of 65 million acre-feet (80 billion m3, which is more than four times the 
average annual flow of 15 million acre-feet (18.5 billion m3) (Skogerboe, 1982). 
Ths  river is the major source of water for the four upper basin states of 
Wyommg, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico (in whch 83 percent of the water is 
produced) as well as the lower basin states of California, Nevada and Arizona. 
Tbs 2300 km long river (see Figure 4) begins in a pristine mountain environment 
more than 4000 meters in elevation, from which it descends through a high pla- 
teau and eventually a low desert, creating such scenic spectacles as the Grand 
Canyon during its journey. 
The river produces the lowest outflow per unit area of any river in the US 
(60 acre-feet per square mile). It serves 15 million people includmg drinking 
water for about 10 million people in Los Angeles (an'export from the basin); how- 
ever, irrigation is by far the largest use of water. Given these conditions of 
extensive development in a semi-arid climate, one mlght expect a classical 
situation for salinity problems. Add to this setting the fact that much of the 
river flows through shale formations that are notorious salt producers; then con- 
sider the fact that the high plateau of the basin is a rich storehouse for all sorts 
of fossil fuels, development of which is currently producing a rapidly growing 
major new use for water. One indication of the growing attention being directed 
to the salinity problem is that in a recent volume of the international journal 
"Water Supply and Management" whch was totally devoted to water and energy 
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Figure 4 .  Colorado River major impoun&.ents. 
development in t h s  basin, virtually all of the papers discuss salinity, and in 
seven of the twelve papers, salinity is the principal subject (Skogerboe, editor, 
1982). The current sources of salinity have been quantified (Lawrence and 
Saunders, 1981) as follows: 
Natural d i f f u s e  sources : 39% 
Natural point sources : 8% 
Irrigated agriculture : 37% 
Municipal and industrial : 1% 
Ezports out of the basin : 3% 
fiaporation and phreatophytes : 12% 
Total : 100% 
Considerable research effort has been devoted to the subject of salinity- 
related damages in general and to damages within the Colorado Basin in particu- 
lar. One such major study (Anderson and Kleinman, 1978), or its summary ver- 
sion (Kleinman and Brown, 1980), is now widely quoted (with annual inflation 
corrections) as a basis for quantifying such damages. The current estimate is 
f 370,000 per year per mg /l of increase in salinity a t  Imperial Dam. 
Much of the political interest in salinity control is generated by the fact 
that a significant amount of damage now occurs to irrigated agriculture in the 
very productive Imperial Valley region of the lower basin. Agricultural damages 
vary with particular ions and crops, but in general, they become apparent in the 
600 to 700 mg/l range, and water at  Imperial Dam now contains more than 800 
mg/l. The economic analysis cited previously found that most of the direct 
damages occur -not to agriculture, but to municipal water users (in the form of 
more rapid replacement of hot water heaters and other plumbing components), 
principally in Los Angeles. 
Another political aspect of the problem is that the river is international- it 
ends in Mexico, and the lowest water quality is in the Mexican reach. The only 
flows which now reach Mexico are those required by a treaty agreement. The 
original treaty did not mention quality, but after extensive damages occurred 
due to hghly saline return flows from a project just inside the US border, an 
agreement was reached in 1973 that required the US to deliver water to Mexico 
a t  no more than 115i30 mg/1 greater salinity than that  a t  Imperial Dam. Details 
of the Mexican salinity problem are given by Holburt and also by van Schilfgarde 
in Skogerboe, editor (1982). 
Efforts by water resource leaders in the seven basin states to organize a 
collective salinity management policy resulted in 1960 in forming a conference. 
A t  the seventh session of this group (in 1972) the states agreed to adopt a policy 
of attempting to not exceed current salinity levels, but delaying adoption of 
numeric criteria for salinity while the Upper Basin states continued to develop 
their share of the water and recognizing that  salinity levels may rise until 
effective control measures are developed. However, federal environmental legis- 
lation in 1972 forced a stronger policy. The very different vested interest and 
objectives of the upper and lower basin states are described by Lawrence and 
Saunders (1981) as follows: 
Passage of Public  L a w  92-500, h o w e v e r ,  forced  a c t i o n  o n  the  par t  of 
the c o n f e r e e s  w h i c h  t h e y  bel ieved t o  be p r e m a t u r e .  I t  was apparen t  t h a t  
the EPA w o u l d  n o t  s e t t l e  f o r  a n y t h i n g  l e s s  than n u m e r i c a l  s t a n d a r d s  b y  
October 15 ,  1975,  a n d  that i f  the s t a t e s  did n o t  c o m e  u p  'With a n  acceptable 
proposal ,  the .  EPA w o u l d  in all Likelihood pub l i sh  s t a n d a r d s  t h e m s e l v e s .  O n  
N o v e m b e r  9, 1973,  t h e  s e v e n  Colorado R iver  Basin s t a t e s  f o r m e d  the  
Colorado R iver  Basin S a l i n i t y  Control F o m m  with m e m b e r s  appoin ted  b y  
t h e  g o v e r n e r s  of t h e  re spec t i ve  s t a t e s ,  t o  addres s  t he  i s s u e s  o f :  (1 )  es tab-  
l i sh ing  n u m e r i c  c r i t e r ia  fo r  s a l i n i t y  in the  Colorado River  Bas in ;  a n d  ( 2 )  
developing a p l a n  of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  i n s u r e  t h a t  those c r i f e r in  
w e r e  m e t .  
Accomplishment of Initial Obje ctives.-At first glance, it seemed that 
the f o r u m  was  faced with an impossible task.  Since the EPA seemed to be 
f irmly commit ted to standards of salinity concentration at t h e n  ezisting 
levels,  not  only could no  salts be added to the r iver  s y s t em ,  but  no dilution 
water  could be removed.  The Forum. could easily have been polarized, 
since the lower basin had a n  economic stake in maintaining present salin- 
i t y  levels, while the upper b a s i n  had a min imal  salinity problem, but 
wanted to r ema in  free to develop remaining unused compact allocations. . . 
Over t i m e ,  i t  became apparent that maintaining present salinity levels 
while allowing further  water  development could be accomplished by  a two- 
pronged approach: ( I )  min imiz ing  salt pickup f r o m  future developments,  
and (2)  reducing, wherever practical, present salt .inpow to the s y s t e m  
f r o m  natural  and man induced  sources. The first action could be accom- 
plished b y  imposing additional design criteria for proposed in-igation pro- 
jects,  and presented relatively little problem. The second action, which 
potentially could result  in m u c h  larger reductions of salinity,  would 
require a substantial outlay of funds. , . . The Forum began to generate 
support for federal salinity control legislation, and on  June 24, 1974, the 
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act (Public Law 93-320) was  passed. 
W l e  I of the Sal ini ty  Control Act authorized measures  which would 
ensure that water  deliveries to Mezico would mee t  the quality require- 
m e n t s  of Minute 242. 37ifle II dealt with salinity control projects above 
Imperial Dam; it authorized construction of the Orand Valley, Paradoz, 
Gbystal Geyser, a n d  Las Vegas Wash h i t s ,  and investigation of twelve other 
projects. The costs of each unit were to be financed 75% by  the federal 
government ,  and 25Z f rom the states through the @per Colorado River 
Basin f i n d  a n d  the Lower Colorado River Basin development f i n d .  
In June 1975, the Forum completed the draft "Water Quality Standards for 
Sahnity Including Numeric Criteria m d  Plan of lmplementation for Salinity Con- 
trol." 
A special group was formed within the Bureau of Reclamations and assigned 
to the Colorado River Quality Improvement Program. Ths  group is contin- 
with various salinity management activities. 
One of the very complex aspects of regional salinity management is the 
extent to which almost any management activity impacts other parts of the sys- 
tem. For example, removal of salt by use of LQW for cooling or for a non- 
convective pond system seems to be a desirable approach; however, regardless 
of the water quality, LQW is currently treated under water law like any other unit 
of water volume. The Colorado River water has been completely allocated (prob- 
ably over-allocated) among each basin state for many years, and each state's 
water law system and water right agency has in turn formalized the legal share 
of each tributary belonging to individual users or groups of users. If therefore, a 
large amount of LWQ in Utah is evaporated specifically to reduce salinity in Cali- 
fornia, an interesting question arises as to whch state's allocation such a diver- 
sion will be charged. 
Another example is that while it is possible to reduce salinity by allocating 
water to special energy-related activities, an equal effect both in terms of down- 
stream salinity and water flows might be achieved by taking some irrigated land 
out of production or by changing irrigation technology on certain salt-producmg 
soils. Questions then arise as to relative economic, social, and political impacts 
of each alternative. In a basin of this size there are thousands of such tradeoffs 
to be analyzed. 
6. SCENARIO MODULE 
The scenario generating module for the Colorado basin described in this 
section (also see Figure 3) includes an expanded version of a regional model 
developed previously a t  the Utah Water Research Laboratory (UWRL) (Naray- 
anan, Padungchai and Bishop, 1979) and a model describing a technology based 
on the use of non-convective ponds (NCP). Ths last model, wbch is described in 
Hughes and Orlovsky (1982) and outlined in this section, was used to obtain an 
aggregated data related to the implementation of this technology for the subse- 
quent use of these data in the regional model. 
The original LP model allocated water in a manner whch maximized net 
benefits to the energy (both primary fossil fuel mining activities and energy 
conversion processes) and agricultural sectors. The UWRL model included both 
water and salt balance constraints and therefore could also quantify the impacts 
upon salinity of alternative water allocations. This generalized model had been 
applied (Narayanan, et .  al., 1979) to the Upper Colorado River Basin. In addition 
to conventional energy-agricultural water uses, the application also included 
several potential salinity management projects such as canal lining, sprinkler 
irrigation, evaporation ponds and desalination plants which had been proposed 
by the US Bureau of Reclamation in the Upper Colorado Basin. 
The model did not, however, take into account the possibility of using low 
quality water for cooling of power plants, nor the non-convective pond technol- 
ogy for disposal of brine. The UWRL model has therefore been modified and 
expanded during this study in collaboration with Rangesan Narayanan in order 
to add these capabilities. A simplified schematic of the revised model is shown 
in Figure 5. 
The original UWRL model is described in detail in Narayanan e t  al., (1979). 
The description that follows will detail only the changes to that model. The 

orlginal model will, however, be described in a very summary fashon 
6.1. Original Model Description 
Objective finctwn 
The UWRL model maximizes the following objective function: 
2 = n ~ +  n~ - TCSM, (8) 
where the n, represent the net return from agriculture and energy, and TCW is 
total annual cost of salinity management activities. Each .rri is defined as annu- 
ahzed total revenue (TR) minus total cost (TC) 
Constraints 
The UWRL model included the following types of constraints: 
Land: Irrigated land is classified between cropland and pasture and the 
sum of land used for each of several crops which are suited to each 
water resource sub-area (WRSA) are limited to the quantity of crop or 
pasture land designated for that WRSA. 
Crop rotation: Crop rotation constraints for proper crop diversification 
and soil quality are included as ratios of particular types of crops. 
Energy output: The quantities of each raw material directly sold on the 
market plus the sum of each raw material (coal, oil, gas, oil shale, tar  
sands, uranium) flows to all conversion processes in the WRSA must 
equal the total extracted (which in turn is constrained to an upper 
limit). 
Conversion process eEiciency: Final products are limited by efficiency 
of conversion processes. 
Water requirements and availability: Agricultural water divers ions and 
return flows are calculated as estimated consumption per unit of land 
per crop in each WRSA. Water use for energy is estimated per unit of 
output for each output and because of environmental regulations, no 
return flows are expected. 
Water availabilities: Average annual flows into each downstream WRSA 
are calculated as inflows minus diversion, plus return flows, plus local 
tributary flows. 
Institutional restrictions: In the upper Colorado, application net diver- 
sion in each upper basin state is limited to the legal entitlement (a  
particular fraction of the total flow). 
Water quality: Salt balance equations use estimated salinity concentra- 
tions of both diversions and agricultural return flows in each WRSA to 
calculate salt flows to downstream subregions. 
Salinity projects: Sprinkler irrigation reduces salt loading (relative to 
flood irrigation) by decreasing return flow. Canal 1 q  reduces salt by 
reducing deep percolation. Conversion to sprinkling is allowed by 
repeating all irrgation activity variables and constraints for the sprin- 
kling mode. Canal lining is modeled by estimated maximum lengths 
and salinity impact per unit of length for lmings in each WRSA. Other 
special evaporation pond and desalting projects at  major LQW locations 
are allowed as estimated by the USBR. 
Downstream salinity changes: Since the model calculates both water 
and salt flows a t  the exit of each WRSA it is possible to constrain the 
downstream salinity to any particular level and observe the 
configuration of agriculture, energy, and salinity management projects 
necessary to achieve that salinity while maintaining economic 
efficiency. Ths is a very important capability which allows analysis of a 
wide range of management strategies and not only their impact on 
total regional economic efficiency but also their impact on agricultural 
or energy activities in individual sub-regions. 
6.2. Modifications for LQW Use in Cooling and NonConvective Ponds 
The modifications to  the original UWRL model are those necessary to add 
the capability of modeling use of LQW for industrial cooling and brine disposal by 
non-convective solar ponds rather than conventional evaporation ponds. These 
changes require new variables, new constraints, and new terms added to existing 
constraints and to  the objective. 
The new salinity management alternatives to be considered will be defined 
in terms of 5 alternative technologies or configurations a t  any location where an 
opportunity exists for use of LQW for industrial cooling. For simplicity's sake, 
the notation will refer to  cooling of fossil fuel power plants only, but the model 
would easily generalize to any industrial cooling application. The 5 alternatives 
are defined in Table 2.  
Table 2. Alternative Technologies. 
Spec ia l  Cooling 
Power P l a n t  NCP Tower '(High S a l i n i t y )  : Brine Disposal 
ALT Water Source Water Source F o s s i l  P l a n t  f N.C. P l a n t  Method 
1 HQ - No 
2 HQ LQ No 1 
3 LQ LQ Y e s  
4 LQ - Y e s  
5 No Power LQ - 
P l a n t  
- Evap. Pond 
Y e s  N.C. Pond 
Y e s  N.C. Pond 
- Evap. Pond 
Yes N.C. Pond 
'This p l a n t  has a conventional  tower f o r  94% of  t h e  cooling load  and a h igh  
s a l i n i t y  tower which handles  t h e  r c~aa in in7  cool in3  load and concgnt ra tes  t h e  
b r i n e  t o  120,000 mgl. 
The orlginal model includes power plant activity variables in terms of MWH 
of electricity produced. The particular power plants where the salinity manage- 
ment alternatives are to be considered will therefore also use this dimension, as 
will the NCP projects. The required new constraints are the following: 
Capacity of Special Power Plants 
The total capacity of the K-th potential power plant in WRSA is assumed not 
to exceed a planned upper limit Bi.  Therefore: 
4 
z P P k 4 B i  ( e a c h s  andk)  
i = 1  
where PPA is the production of electricity using the i-th technological alterna- 
tive (Table 2). This theoretically allows a combination of alternatives at a slngle 
plant; however, it was hoped that in general a single alternative would be 
selected. It does not make sense, for example, to have a combination of alterna- 
tive 5 and any other alternatives at a single location; however, a combination of 
alternatives 2 and 3 implies simply a mixture of h g h  and low quality makeup 
water for the cooling tower (which may well be the best solution). Therefore, a 
discrete 0,1 algorithm was not selected, but rather an LP formulation. If an 
inconsistent combination does occur at  a particular site it could easily be elim- 
inated by forcing either alternative to zero in a subsequent solution, 
Capacity of non-convective ponds 
Alternatives 2 and 3 require non-convective ponds which are sized properly 
for utilizing the brine from power plant blowdown. Therefore, the activity level 
(in MWH) of the k-th NC pond in WRSA's using alternative 2 ( N &  must be func- 
tionally related to that of power plant PPL. Therefore, we add the following con- 
straints: 
N a s a h P P k  (i=2,3), (1 0) 
where a k  is the ratio of maximum NC pond to power plant output (calculated by 
the NCP sub-model-to be hscussed later) 
Also, an upper limit pi5  on production of the NCP in alternative 5 must be 
given: 
Diversion of w a t e r  for power  p lants  
It is necessary to calculate total water diverted for power plants (WPPP), 
and also for NC ponds ( WNCT'), in each WRSA in order to subtract these quanti- 
ties from water flows leaving each WRSA. Therefore, we add 
and also 
C Sg.Nc", = WNCP 
i=2.3.5 
(13) 
where the /3 and a constraints are water use per unit of electricity produced by 
the power plants and NC ponds respectively. These totals are then subtracted 
from the water balance rows (including points a t  each state boundary) in the 
original model. 
Water balance for low quality w a t e r  
In addition to total water balance constraints, it is also necessary to limit 
total diversion of LQW to its availability as follows: 
where the SS; are other (existing) salinity management variables such as eva- 
poration ponds, desalination plants, or coal slurry Lines using LQW (in terms of 
tons of salt removed); Wi are quantities of water per ton of salt; and the LQWG 
are quantities of LQW available. 
Salt balance constraints  
Salt diversions by special power plants and by NC ponds are calculated as: 
where and ph are the salt diverted per unit of output of the power plants and 
NC ponds respectively. These terms are added to existing salt balance con- 
straints. 
Co a1 supply  
In order to account for coal supplied to special power plants i t  is neces- 
sary t o  add the following terms to equations which calculate coal use per unit of 
electricity produced: 
6.3. Power Plant Water/Salt Flow Functions 
The regional model requires as input data, water and salt demands, and 
waste streams as functions of plant capacity and technology. The technologies 
modeled are defined in Table 2. Alternative 1 represents the status quo-- 
conventional cooling towers using high quality water and a zero discharge eva- 
poration pond for brine disposal. Alternatives 3 and 4 require a h g h  salinity 
cooling tower capable of concentrating cooling water to  120,000 mg/l before 
blowdown. Alternative 2 requires a combination of both types of cooling tower or 
a t  least a brine concentrator for the waste stream. Therefore, three types of 
technologies are required. 
Alternative I-conventional technology 
The phrase "conventional technology" is very ambiguous, since modern 
cooling tower systems vary greatly in their desrgn and particularly in their ratio 
of water demand (tower makeup water) to waste stream (blowdown). The princi- 
pal variation is related to the extent to which brine is concentrated. In the con- 
text of total water budget, the problem is complicated by the fact that cooling is 
not the only water demand. Boiler process water losses are significant (roughly 
5 percent of cooling demand); if air scrubbers are required, another water 
demand is added (same order of magnitude as boiler makeup) and ash handling 
may be either by water or air. Figure 6 shows a typical water cycle through 
such a plant. The width of the flow arrows suggests relative magnitudes. 
Figure 6 .  Power  plant  w a t e r  f l o w s .  
The focus of this study was on changes in water flows due to various cooling 
tower technologies. It was possible to ignore flows other than the cooling cycle 
(since they are independent of type of coo&). This means, for example, that 
disposal pond areas discussed here will tend to be slightly smaller than total 
areas required because they do not include waste streams from such com- 
ponents as the generator building and the air scrubber 
Recent experience in the US suggests that in an environment where water is 
scarce and where strict environmental regulations on effluents exist, it is most 
economical to use extensive treatment of cooling water and perhaps some 
desalination in order to both conserve water and to reduce the size of disposal 
.ponds, lsraelsen et  al., (1980) describe and quantify the water and salt budgets 
of two such technology mixes-cold process softening of both tower makeup and 
sidestream (Israelsen's option 2); and use of a brine concentrator plus side 
stream softening (their option 3). 
Conventional cooling (our alternative 1) will be defined here as follows: a 
high quality source (not over 300 rng/l tds) will be softened to allow concentra- 
tion of blowdown to 10,000 mg 11. Thls will be accomplished by keeping the total 
of Mg + + Ca + +, and Si O2 concentrations below 400 mg /l. Ths  will likely require 
softening of the tower-makeup source in addition to the sidestream softening 
shown in Figure 6. The quantities of makeup and blowdown are estimated (after 
Israelsen et  al., 1980) as follows: 
Mnkeup = 16+ ( 1 . 6 3 ) S h u  (acre -feet / M W / yr)  
or = 19.7+(2.O)Shu (10'm3/ M W  / y) 
B~c?~do-um = ( 1 . 6 ) S h u  (acre -feet / M W / y r )  
or = ( 1 . 9 7 ) S h u  (103m3/ M W  / y r )  
where S h u  is in metric tons/m3 or (mg/l times lo-'). These functions are 
shown in Flgure 7 
E 
C) Alt. 1 
0 
Figure 7. Power plant water supply and waste quantities. 
Alternative 3-Use of LQW f o r  Cooling plus NCP 
Since alternative 2 requires a mixture of technologies 1 and 3, its discus- 
sion will be delayed. Alternative 3 uses LQW as the tower makeup. In the appli- 
cation to be described later, these concentrations vary from 2,700 to 5,000 
mg/l. These already poor quality sources will be concentrated to 120,000 mg/l 
before blowdown. 
In order to operate a cooling tower at such high salinities, a secondary loop 
is required in which a thin plastic membrane separates the saline water which is 
being evaporated from hot high quality water which is a closed loop from the 
condenser heat exchanger. The membrane therefore becomes a secondary heat 
exchanger. Such a tower has been successfully tested in the US (EPRI, 1981), 
and will be referred to as the binary cooling tower (bct). Israelsen et  al. (1980) 
give water budgets for the bct as follows (also shown in Flgure 7): 
Makeup = 12.75+ (0 .095)Shu (acre -feet / MW / yr) 
OT = 15.7+(.117)Shu ( 1 0 ~ r n ~ /  M W /  yr) 
Blowdourn = .25+( .093)Shu ( a c ~ e  -feet / MW / y.) 
or = .31+(.115)SCmzL ( 1 0 ~ r n ~ /  ~ w / y r )  
Disposal of brine is in a non-convective pond, which will be hscussed later. 
Alterndive 2-HQW f o ~  Cooling Plus NCP 
The binary cooling tower (bct) system described previously was orginally 
designed for use as a brine concentrator whch, as a side benefit, also handled a 
small part of the c o o h g  load--rather than the total cooling load as required by 
Alternative 2. The principle is that the blowdown from a conventional tower 
becomes the makeup supply for the bct portion of the cooling tower. The con- 
ventional tower blowdown at say 5,000 mg/l is further concentrated to about 
120,000 mg/l (which also involves additional softening). The water and salt flows 
assumed here for alternative 2 could likely also be produced by adding a 
desalination-type brine concentrator to the alternative 1 system, although the 
conventional tower would need to be slightly larger. 
Alternative 2 is assumed to consist of a HQW source for a conventional tower 
whch carries :5/ 16 of the cooling load plus a bct unit which carries 1 /15 of the 
load and which produces an effluent at  120,000 mg/l tds (Sanderson et  al., 
unpublished). Disposal is via an NCP system. 
Alternatives 4 and 5 
Technology 4 is the same as 3 except that brine disposal is by a normal eva- 
poration pond, rather than an NCP. 
Technology 5 does not involve a fossil-fueled power plant at  all--it is simply 
an NCP system for disposal of LQW. 
6.4. NonConvective Pond Model 
The basic idea of a salt gradient solar pond is to float a t b  layer of fresh 
water over a few meters depth of highly saline brine. If the salinity gradient of 
the layer between these two qualities of water is sufficiently steep, the brine 
temperature can approach 100CO without mixing convectively with the lighter, 
although colder surface layer. Since the cooling effect of evaporation is 
confined to the surface layer, the brine can become both a solar collector and 
an effective heat storage reservoir. 
This concept has produced a considerable body of literature (see, for exam- 
ple, JPL, 1982, and Tabor and Weinberger, undated). Most of the literature is 
addressed to the idea of finding an ideal site where either a source of hghly 
saline brine (near saturation) already exists such as at  inland seas, or where salt 
in solid form can be easily mined to produce such brine. Thls research, how- 
ever, addresses the notion of using the waste stream from an electric generating 
plant as the source of brine plus a less saline but still low quality source for 
freshening the upper layer of the NCP. In this settmg, the volume and salinity of 
both sources of water and the timing of expansion of such a system (as more 
brine is produced) become very important. A separate optimization model for 
t h s  rather difficult non-linear systems problem was developed during this study 
and is described in a separate publication (Hughes and Orlovsky, 1982). A brief 
summary of that model follows: 
The NCP pond system is shown in Figure 8. The brine production pond 
(pond 2) is required to concentrate ( to  about 260,000 mg/l) the 120,000 mg/l 
power plant effluent from the NCP surface layer. The working pond (pond 3) 
requires the heavy brine both for initial filling of each pond increment and for 
replacing salt lost to the upper layer by diffusion. The upper layer is maintained 
at  about 50,000 mg/l by Aushng blowdown back to pond 2 and replacing blow- 
down plus evaporation from the LQW source (2,000 to 5,000 mg/l).  Pond 1 (miss- 
ing from the figure) may be needed to regulate the supply of LQW. 
Another water demand is related to cooling of te NCP energy conversion 
system if the final energy form is to be electricity rather than heat. Ths  pro- 
cess creates another waste stream whch  is also used to produce brine. 
The problem whch is solved by using this model is the following: 
Given: (1) the water and salt quantities available a t  a particular site; (2) the 
evaporation, precipitations, radiation, and other physical characteristics of the 
site; and (3) the costs of constructing and operating the pond'and energy 
conversion system and the estimated revenue from the sale of energy-what is 
the best size and timing of construction for each cell of ponds 2 and 3? 
Both the generalized model and its application at  seven sites in the 
Colorado River upper basin are described by Hughes and Orlovsky (1982). The 
results will be summarized in the subsequent section of t h s  report. 
Pond 3 
(Low quality source -but sdecuate 
for freshening surfece kyer of NCP.) 
EYm. to river 
Figure 8. NCP schematic including thermal/electric conversion 
water demand. 
7. APPLICATION OF THE SCENARlO MODULE TO THE COLORADO RlVER 
7.1. I Q W  Use Alternatives at Individual Sites 
The scenario module was applied to the Upper Basin of the Colorado River in 
a mode that included most of the potential salinity management projects which 
are being considered by the Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program 
(CRWQIP) of the US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). These include conversion 
from flood to sprinkler irrigation, lining of canals, plus several site-specific alter- 
natives includmg use of LQW for cooling by electric generating plants at  7 indivi- 
dual sites which have been identified by the USBR as being withn 100 miles (160 
km) of a significant source of LQW (see Figure 9). Any of the 5 alternative tech- 
nologies defined in Table 2 could be selected at  each of these sites. USBR stu- 
dies to date have included the concept of using LQW for cooling at  these sites 
with brine &sposal in conventional ponds, and have also considered the possibil- 
ity of NCP systems at other sites (such as the terminus of very large coal slurry 
pipelines). This study, however, analyzes the coupling of power plant waste 
streams to NCP systems at  individual plant sites. 
Physical I n p u t  Data 
The quantities of water and salt available at  each of these sites and the 
water demands and waste streams associated with each of the cooling technolo- 
gies are given in Table 3. 
The NCP model was used to determine the pond areas, water demands, and 
energy capacities of ponds shown in Table 4. The time for reachmg equilibrium 
(when all available LQW is needed for NCP pond freshening plus cooling) varies 
greatly; therefore, an arbitrary planning peeriod of 30 years was used for all 
sites to calculate the quantities shown in this table. 
The NCP model output also provides information on quantities of salt 
removable from the river a t  each site due to each technology. These quantities 
are shown in Table 5.  
....... Regional model 
water resource 
subareas 
I 
I 
NEW MEX. 
Figure 9. Subwatersheds and potential power plants close to 
sources of low quality water. 
Table 3 .  F o s s i l  f u e l  power p l a n t  water demands and waste  str,eams (water and s a l t  dimensions a r e  
1 0 3 ~ 3  and mg/l r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  
Alt. No. 1 Alt. NO. 2 Alt. No. 3 & 4 LQW Remaining 
Total Power for NCP Freshening 
Available Salt Plant HQW 8000 mgl HQW 120,000 mgl LQW 120,000 mgl 
Site LQw Conc. MWe Makeup Blowdown Makeup Blowdown Makeup Blowdown Alt. 2 & 5 Alt. 3 
Big Sandy 17,900 5 , 0 0 0  350 7,130 173 5,520 120 5,725 302 17,900 12,170 
Uintah Basin 16,780 4,500 800 11,930 395 12,610 274 13,030 661 16,780 3,750 
Price River 10,490 4,000 500 10,180 246 7,880 172 8,100 383 10,490 2,380 
San Rafael 8,390 3,600 400 8,140 197 6,300 137 
63 
Grand Valley 33,560 3,300 800 11,930 395 12,610 274 12,960 497 33,560 20,600 I 
Lower Gun. 21,220 2,900 800 11,930 395 12,610 274 21,220 8,400 12,830 494 
2,700 1,600 32,580 790 25,230 550, 25,670 990 25,670 0 1 McElmo Creek 25,670 
3 3 l~ssumed that HQW is available for this purpose at $25/10 M --this site only; other sites were modeled as being limited 
by quantity of LQW available. 
T a b l e  4 .  P o n d  areas, LQW w a t e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and  electr ic  g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  of ponds af te r  30 y e n r e .  
Pond A r e a s  ( 1 0 ' ~ ~ )  
NCP Water Requ i remen t s  
(LQW i n  a d d i t i o n  to F o s s i l  
P l a n t  Blowdown) (10'~') 
o f  Evap. 
Minus 
P r e c i p .  A l t .  1 A l t .  2  A l t .  3  A l t .  4  A l t .  5  A l t .  2  Alt. 3 G e n e r a t i n g  
cap .  o f  NCP 
Evap. & B r i n e  (10' M W H / Y r )  
B r i n e  Evap. Prod.  B r i n e  Evap . 
S i t e  Pond NCP Pond Pond NCP Pond NCP Pond NCP F r e s h e n i n g  C o o l i n g  F r e s h e n i n g  C o o l i n g  A l t .  2 n i t .  3 I 
ul 
Big  Sandy 5 .6  6 .4  1 ,214  0 0 0 0 3 , 7 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 w I 
U i n t a h  B a s i n  17 .0  18 .2  915  3 ,063 2 ,163 3 ,594 1 , 9 4 5  1 , 6 0 0  0 L,775 9 1 1  1 , 5 0 5  772 5.83 5 .24 
P r i c e  R i v e r  17.2 18 .4  567 1 ,954 1 , 3 7 6  2 ,663 1 , 5 4 0  9 9 0  0 L1142 582 1 , 2 7 4  6 50 3.7 4.17 
San  R a f a e l  17.4 18.6 445 1 ,497  1 ,014  2 ,049 1 ,276  776 0 84 7  4  40  1 ,027  533 2.73 3.44 
Grand V a l l e y  16.8 18 .0  9 3 1  3 ,061  2 ,156  5 ,254 4,144 1 , 6 2 5  0 L,724 898  3 ,358  1 , 7 2 6  5.82 11.11 
Lower Gunnison 16.8  18.0 9 3 1  2 ,755 2,067 4 ,968 3,914 1 , 6 2 5  0 L,638 858  3 ,172  1 ,637  5.50 1 0 . 5 1  
McElmo C r e e k  46.1 49.4 672  1 ,907  4 ,434 3 ,433  7 ,982 1 ,1173 0 7,486 2 ,229 1 3 , 4 1 6  4 ,390 13.13 23.9 
T a b l e  5. S a l t  d i v e r s i o n  a t  f o s s i l  power p l a n t  p l u s  NCP sites. 
( Q u a n t i t i e s  are US t o n s - - m u l t i p l y  b y  . g o 7 2  t o  g e t  metric 
t o n s )  . 
A l t .  1 A l t .  2 A l t .  3 A l t .  4 
S i t e  P . P .  P . P .  NCP T o t a l  P . P .  NCP 'Ibtal  P . P .  
B i g  S a n d y  
U i n t a h  B a s i n  
P r i c e  River 
San R a f a e l  
Grand V a l l e y  
Lower Gun. 
McElmo C r e e k  
T o t a l s  
Cost Coefficients 
The model does not explicitly calculate total revenue and subtract costs; 
rather, it  simply multiplies the total quantity of any product by the estimated 
net profit (or loss) per unit. In the case of electricity, net profit in the original 
model varied over sub-regions but averaged $13/MWH (1975 dollars). This profit 
dominated all agricultural production in terms of competmg for water allocation 
and therefore, no purpose would have been served by the laborious task of 
updating all agricultural and energy costs and revenues (500 variables) to 1982 
levels (and perhaps obtainrng the same net dflerence in many cases). What was 
important in the model revision process was to obtain adequate current esti- 
mates of the net return to energy production activities since the objective of the 
new portion of the model is to compare economic efficiency of various cooling 
tower and brine disposal technologies. Ths  was also not an easy task, since the 
unit costs of both evaporation and solar salt gradient ponds (NCP) cited by vari- 
ous sources vary by several hundred percent. Also, the wholesale value of elec- 
tricity varies greatly depending upon whether it is peak or base load 
It appears that electricity produced by NCP systems would be best used in 
a peaking mode, because of (1) very low start-up costs, and (2) the much hgher  
production in summer (the peak electricity demand season in parts of the 
Colorado Basin). Therefore, a hlgher value of NCP electricity may be justified. 
The model was run with two values of gross revenue from electricity--!357/MWH, 
which is considered to be consistent with the $13 net revenue estimate for con- 
ventional power plants, and $95/MWH. The latter figure was used by the USBR in 
a related study of NCP systems (USBR unpublished report, 1981 b). 
Pond costs (either conventional or NCP) are difficult to estimate without a 
detailed site analysis of each site (whch was beyond the scope of this study). 
The principal cost component is usually the lining. The purpose of the lining is 
to prevent contamination of groundwater and/or prevent brine from seeping 
toward the river. At sites where groundwater is already highly saline, no lining 
may be required. Where highly impervious soils are available near the site, a 
compacted clay lining may be used rather than the much more costly rubber or 
plastic membrane lining. A recent UWRL publication (Israelsen et  al., 1980) esti- 
mates the cost of ponds with a membrane lining at  $6-10 per m Z  The model 
runs reported here used costs varying from $2.7 to $10 per mZ.  Since individual 
site conditions are not yet known, the same costs were used at all sites for any 
particular run. 
7.2. Results 
Descriptions of Model Runs 
The regional model was run several times with a range (pessimistic to 
optimistic) of pond unit costs and price of electricity from the NCP systems and 
with various other changes in model constraints. These input data constraints 
and a brief summary of the results are shown in Table 6. 
An important parameter that was varied is the constraint on change in 
salinity at  Lee's Ferry (a measuring station near the exit to the upper basin). 
Environmental regulations have been interpreted as requiring no increase in 
lower Colorado Basin salinity above 1972 levels. Therefore, an important capa- 
bility of t h s  model is that of either (1) fixing the salt concentration at  the upper 
basin outlet at  that (or some other) level and observing the salinity management 
activities and the changes in agricultural and energy related water use whch 
best achieve that water quality (in terms of economic eficiency); or (2) allowing 
the salinity to vary and observing resulting changes in water quality and 
economic efficiency. 
Other special constraints which were included in some model runs were the 
elimination of downstream benefits due to salinity reduction and also forclng 
particular management activities in or out of a solution. 
The model consists of B sub-watersheds, 5 of which contain one or more of 
the sites where use of LQW for cooling and for NCP sub-systems were considered 
(Flgure 9). The type of information included in Table 6 (plus a great deal more 
detailed information) could therefore be presented for each sub-basin. It is not 
the intent of this report, however, to propose detailed site-specific recommenda- 
tions. Rather, the intent is to demonstrate the model capabilities in a qualita- 
tive manner and to compare alternative types of salmity management activites 
and their approximate range of impact on the system given the assumptions on 
costs and efficiencies. For that purpose, the regional summary information con- 
tained in Table 6 is adequate. 
Table 6. Summary o f  Regional Model Application Results. 
-- 
-- - 
RUN SPECIFICATIUJS ---A S01,IIPIONS - 
Salinity at Lee's Alternativr Technology Selected 
Cost Data Ferry % Chanqe in Optimal Solutlon 
Indicator' From 1972 - (AF)' (AF) 
-- Misc. Power Plant Sito Total Total Lee's Net Benefit cost n 
Run Pond Price of ?ixed Solution Special UF AG Ferry Minus a Reven~~e 
No. Conts Electricity At Level Constraints RS UR PR SR GV LG Mc Used Diversions . (10'~~) Larqe constdnta Rdnqos 
free 
0 
0 
-5.0 
free 
0 
free 
free 
0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
0 
free 
-2.0 
free 
free 
-2.0 
free 
none 
none 
coal slurry 
llnes deleted 
none 
all alt.=3 
except BS 
none 
none 
no downstream 
benefits 
no downstream 
benefits 
none 
no downstream 
benefits 
none 
none 
none 
none 
all all.=) 
except 2 
none 
SR=3 (fixed) 
2 
'Lo pond cost = $2.7/n2 for brine makeup and $7.0/n2 for NCP; hi pond cost = $4.8 nnd $lO/M ; 
La price of electricity = $57/MUH; Hi price of electricity = $95/MW?I. 
6 
'~un 10 objective function - 5797.82197 (10 1 was subtracted to improve scale. 
3 3 
'AF multlplled by 1.234 - 10 M . 
Comparison of EnergwReLated Alternatives 
(1) The solution summary suggests that with any cost and low revenue 
assumptions, use of LQW for power plant coollng (alternative 3) is 
economical only at the McElrno Site, where the LQW source is least 
saline (2700 mg/l). Other uses of alternative 3 shown in the table (runs 
10, 11, and 19) were not selected by the optimization routine but were 
forced in order to answer "what if" questions. 
(2) Under most pessimistic cost and revenue assumptions, the use of N C P  
systems (alternatives 2 and 3) for brine disposal is justified only at two 
sites. If the cost assumptions had been made even more pessimistic 
(costs higher and revenue lower), the same selection of power plant 
technologies (mostly conventional coohng and disposal) would remain 
until at  some point alternative 1 would be selected even at Lower 
Gunnison and McElmo. 
(3) Although not shown in the table, all coal slurry alternatives (using LQW) 
entered every solution at maximum levels. The large decrease in LQW 
use by problem 3 relative to 2, the much larger decrease in water use 
by agriculture (necessary to maintain salinity at  the reference level), 
and the large drop in net benefits suggest the magnitude of the 
beneficial role very large coal slurry lines could play in salinity 
management. 
(4) The apparent dominance of alternative 2 at most sites when moderate 
as well as optimistic cost and revenue assumptions are made suggest 
that use of HQW plus NCP systems should have important salinity 
management benefits. 
(5) Salinity reduction is highly correlated with reduction in irrigation 
&versions. When salinity reductions are forced on the model, it 
responds by reducing agricultural diversions rather than increasing 
use of LQW by power plants. 
(6) If use of LQW by power plants other than at McElmo is forced on the 
model, a very significant decrease in total net benefit occurs. Ths  fact 
together with (5) implies that use of alternative 3 is not desirable 
u n i e s s  ob j ec t i ve s  o ther  t h a n  economic  e f f i c i ency  are  i m p o r t a n t .  
(7) The fact that economic criteria do not favor use of LQW for power 
plants does not mean that power plants should not play an important 
role in salinity management (even if non-economic objectives are 
gnored). The importance of use of HQW for cooling but with blowdown 
supplying brine for NCP systems is clearly demonstrated by the solu- 
tion summary. The NCP system is totally infeasible at  sites without a 
supply of highly concentrated brine. The power plant can be conceptu- 
alized as a brine concentrator whch is necessary for any use of NCP's 
at  these sites. This is a crucial difference between the sites modeled 
here and those a t  dry lakes where brine already exists (such as the 
Danby and Sevier sites being modeled by the USBR). 
(8) The left-to-right pattern of increasing use of LQW, particularly by NCP 
systems in the table is not accidental. The power plant sites are listed 
in general order of downstream river movement as well as decreasing 
latitude. Therefore, the h g h  elevation of Big Sandy site has the lowest 
radiation and highest precipitation ( a  very bad NCP site), whle McElmo 
has very high temperatures and low rainfall (with expected results 
favoring use of an NCP system). 
Multi-Obje c t i v e  Conc ep tua l i za t ion  
Figure 10 shows the modeled variation of regional net benefits (to agricul- 
tural plus energy) with downstream salinity for various cost-revenue assump- 
tions. For most functions, there is only a very small variation in benefits (a  slight 
(Hi, Lo) 
Lo. Lo 
\ 
I Hi, Hi W/O Downst. Ben. 
I 
I I 
0 
1 I 
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Net benefits minus a large constant ( lo6 $1 
(see Table 6) 
Figure 1 0 .  Relat ion between n e t  b e n e f i t s  and downstrear 
s a l i n i t y  f o r  var ious c o s t  ass=,ptions. 
slope to the left as salinity is reduced). The apparent reason is that downstream 
benefits are included in the net benefits. Salinity improvement entails costs but 
these are almost balanced by the downstream damages prevented. However, 
when downstream benefits are deleted from the model, the function slope 
increases as shown by the dashed "Hi Hi" cost assumption. 
That particular function can be considered to quantify the tradeoff between 
the two objectives of economic efficiency and environmental quality if all down- 
stream salinity damages are included as environmental impacts. In that  case, 
elimination of downstream benefits from the model objective function is 
required in order not to duplicate the surrogate for environmental quality (salin- 
ity damages). The figure could therefore be revised by repeating all model runs 
without downstream benefits and re-labelling the axes environmental quality and 
economic efficiency. In one sense, t h s  would be stretching the normal 
definition of environment quality, since most of the negative effects of salinity 
are really economic (damages to agricultural and municipal plumbing com- 
ponents). However, the salinity of t h s  water in the lower basin is also approach- 
ing levels where public health effects could be of concern; therefore, an  environ- 
mental quality objective has some logic and in t h s  sense, keeping economic 
damages prevented in the model's single objective function may best represent 
reality. 
Another multi-objective conceptualization is demonstrated by Figure 11. 
Each state government within t h s  region (as well as federal government) places 
great importance on such objectives as rural development and stability of agri- 
cultural production. If we accept diversions of water for agriculture as an  index 
of agric'ultural production (the model defines them as directly proportional) 
then we can consider Figure 11 as demonstrating trade-offs between agriculture 
and environmental quality (salinity). The figure suggests that  an average of 1 

percent reduction in salinity requires 120,000 acre-feet less water allocated to 
irrigation (20,000 AP per mg/l).  This, of course, varies significantly among sub- 
basins and a rational salinity management policy might be to encourage reduc- 
tion in irrigation only in areas where return flows are most saline. 
7.3. Conclusions from Application of Scenario Module 
Conclusions related to policy design for salinity management cannot in gen- 
eral be made until the policy analysis module has been applied and analyzed. 
However, there are  several important points which emerged from analysis of 
scenarios obtained using the regional model, as follows: 
1. The order of magnitude of salt quantities whch  could be removed by 
applying the various management technologies at  each of the seven proposed 
power plant sites w h c h  are within 100 miles of low quality water sources are as 
follows: 
Fraction of 
Tons of Lee's Ferry 
Technology S a l t  Load 
1 .  Sta tus  Quo (no u s e  of LQW) 27,000 0.4% 
2 .  HQW f o r  cooling but add NCP 115,000 1.7 
3 .  LQW f o r  cooling plus  NCP 384,000 5.6 
4 .  LQW f o r  cooling but no NCP 244,000 3.6 
Technology 4 is totally infeasible economically. Therefore potentially realistic 
power plant related salinity reduction alternatives reduce to technologies 2 or 3. 
2. From the viewpoint of purely economic considerations(that is, costs vs. 
economic benefits) technology 3 (use of low quality water for power plant cool- 
ing) is not justified a t  most sites. However, its use may be justified by other 
social objectives such as agricultural based rural development and stability or 
environmental objectives 
3. Use of technology 2 (use of high quality water for cooling but with addi- 
tional effluent concentration for supplying NCP brine) appears to be justified a t  
most sites on a purely economic basis, and even in cases when downstream 
salinity reduction benefits are not considered. 
4. Even though use of LQW for c o o h g  is not cost effective, power plants can 
play an  important role in salinity management if they are coupled to nonconvec- 
tive solar ponds (as in technology 2). NCP's whch are otherwise totally infeasi- 
ble can become economically attractive when coupled to fossil fuel power plants 
w h c h  concentrate their effluent sufficiently. 
5. Motivation of private (or public) power producers to adopt technology 2 
should be possible with very little incentive (financial or other--such as 
expedited site approval) since the only requirement is a h g h  level of brine con- 
centration. Use of brine concentrators or other technologies such as binary 
cooling towers (whch accomplish the same function) are already increasing for 
reasons unrelated to salinity such as  decreasing the size of zero discharge eva- 
poration ponds. 
6. The amount of salt potentially removable a t  seven sites by technology 2 
as given in conclusion 1 (115,000 tons) is greatly understated if one assumes 
that the h g h  quality water acquired for cooling would be purchased from the 
agricultural sector (which usually is the case in this basin). For example, if the 
irrigation water involved was previously diverted a t  a quality of 300 mg/l  and 
50% was returned a t  3,000 mg/l,  the transfer to energy use would remove an 
additional 124,000 tons of salt making the total 239,000 tons. 
7.4. Relation of Model Results to Salinity Management Policy Design 
The foregoing discussion of the regional model application gives rather 
specific details on water and salt flow change related to assumed NCP 
efficiencies and cost coefficients, both for the total region and a t  individual 
power plant sites. The writers do not pretend that salinity management policy 
in the basin should now proceed based upon these numbers. Our modesty is dic- 
tated by the following reasons: 
1. Engineering analysis of NCP system designs including much more 
detailed investigations of energy producion efficiencies, loading pat- 
terns, costs and revenues a t  each site are obviously needed. 
2. Even in the happy but hghly unlikely event that  the model results 
represent the real system perfectly-they still represent only neces- 
sary but not sufficient do rma t ion  for policy deslgn. So far, we have 
said little about the extent to whch individual water using entities 
(farmers, corporations, irrlgation districts, etc.) might be willing to 
change their water use patterns in order to  move toward the  regional 
model solution(s). We have said even less about what kind of policy 
designs and what levels of economic incentives might be required to 
motivate such changes. These are objectives for the second stage of 
this study. 
What we have demonstrated is: (1) the kind of information the model is 
capable of producing, and (2) the approximate range of variation in power plant 
technologies which make economic sense (from the regional perspective) given 
our cost, discount, efficiency, e tc . ,  assumptions. 
We are now in a position to undertake the second stage of the study con- 
cerned with the analysis of salinity management policies, using the economic 
and hydrologic understanding of the system obtained from the scenario module. 
However, policy analysis requires models with several new dimensions. I t  
involves knowledge of the objectives and possibilities of achieving them of the 
principal actors in the water use and policy universe which is to be defined. 
These include various levels of government, their agencies and the water users 
themselves. We plan to  s tar t  using very simple representation of these issues 
with the hope to develop the approach further basing on qualitative results 
obtained using this simplistic version. 
AFTENDM: OUTLINE OF A SIMPLE ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THE SECOND STAGE 
OF THE m y  
As has been discussed in Sect. 3 of t h s  report, the first stage of the analysis 
results in obtaining a regional scenario that can be used as a target scenario a t  
the second stage. According to the formulation of the problem in Sect. 4, we 
can understand a scenario as a tuple of technological matrices denoted by 
(x:, . . . ,x:). Th s  scenario is obtained using the scenario module of the type 
outlined in Sect. 5 of this report and describes the rational from the regional 
perspective allocation of the regional water resources among the producers and 
also in a certain sense degrees of their participation in the improvement of the 
quality of water resources in the region. After having determined this scenario 
we come to the second stage of our analysis. 
To illustrate a possible approach to the second stage we consider it using as 
an example a simple model of one of the energy producers. We assume that the 
k-th producer considered can use water from two sources: one with high quality 
water, and the other with low quality (saline) water. Denote by W: and wk water 
withdrawals from the respective sources allocated to this producer according to 
the scenario obtained a t  the first stage of the analysis. In other words, with- 
drawing these amounts of water from the sources is considered rational from 
the regional perspective. Then the problem of the SMA with respect to t h s  pro- 
ducer may be formulated as that of determining policies effectively motivating 
thts producer towards withdrawing amounts of water from the respective 
sources possibly close to W: and w!. 
We denote by w t ,  i = i , 2  actual amounts of water withdrawn by k-th pro- 
ducer from these sources, and by E : ( W ~ )  the corresponding amounts of electri- 
city produced (using the technologies compatible with the salinities of water 
from the sources considered). Let us also introduce the following notation: 
Kfc - capital investments for i-th technology; 
S! - subsidy (provided by the SMA) for the implementation of the tech- 
nology using the low quality water; 
p~ - market price per unit electricity produced; 
p,k - charge per unit amount of water withdrawn from the source 
i ,  i=1,2.  
rf -interest rate, i=1,2.  
Using this notation, the net benefit function of the k-th producer can, for 
example, be written as follows: 
p (w: = PE[E: (w:)+J@ ( w t ) l - ~ f f i  (wf 1- (1) 
-r$ [e (WE)-st] -p:zuf -PEW; 
With the values of all the parameters in this function fixed, the behavior of the 
k-th producer consists of achieving the greater possible net benefit p by 
appropriately choosing the amounts of water w: and wk satisfying all physical 
as well as institutional constraints specific to the region considered 
The SMA regulation lies in choosing the values of these parameters (or some 
of them) in such a way as to motivate the producer to use the amounts of water 
from the source 2 (with low quality water) not smaller than W; and from the 
source 1 not greater than w:. As has been hscussed earlier in Section 4 of this 
report, the SMA can inform the producers about its functional rules of fixing the 
values of these parameters depend~ng upon the actual amounts of water with- 
drawn from the sources. In t h s  case, the net benefit function of the k-th pro- 
ducer takes the form: 
The SMA expenditures associated with the implementation of these policies 
can be written in the form: 
The goal of the S M A  is to make these expenditures the lowest possible, and also 
to make the vector w2 = ( w i  ,..., w!) not smaller (by elements) than the vector 
(scenario) W2 = ( W; , . . . , w!) and the vector w = (w I' ,..., w r )  not greater than 
the vector (scenario) K1 = (w:, . . . , w?), where w l  and w2 are "responses" of 
the producers to the policies r$ (wg), 5'5 (wk), pf(w5), k = 1,2,.. ,N, i = 1,2. 
An implementation of t h s  analytical scheme can be based on fixing 
appropriate parametric families of these policies and then determining values of 
the parameters which provide for the responses of the producers closer possible 
to the values specified by the scenario. The computational difficulties, although 
not exceptional, call for the application of interactive analytical procedures. 
The elaboration of appropriate interactive models and procedures for thls type 
of analysis is the subject of further research for this study. 
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